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Why have some territories performed better than others in the fight against COVID-19? This paper 
uses a novel dataset on excess mortality, trust and political polarization for 153 European regions to 
explore the role of social and political divisions in the remarkable regional differences in excess mor-
tality during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we argue that it is not only levels, but 
also variations in trust among citizens – in particular, between government supporters and non-sup-
porters – what matters for understanding why people in some regions have adopted more pro-healthy 
behaviour. Second, we hypothesize that the ideological positioning and polarization of such position-
ing among political parties is also linked to higher mortality, for it facilitates taking government 
measures aimed at satisfying core constituencies (e.g. business interests) to the detriment of building 
wide political consensus to undertake unpopular yet necessary measures. Overall, we find that mass 
polarization also played a significant role. When the divide in political trust  between supporters and 
opponents of incumbent governments within societies is high, we observe consistently higher 
COVID-19-related excess mortality deaths during the first wave of the pandemic.  We also find that 
regions with a political elite less supportive of European integration are regions where excess deaths 
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Why does COVID-19 kill more in some places than in others? 
Pasteur stated that “science knows no country because it is the light that illuminates the world”. Yet, 
if something the COVID-19 pandemic is elucidating that the science light seems to shine brighter in 
some regions and countries than in others. Expert recommendations to control the spread of the 
virus – from social distancing or staying at home to adopting novel treatments – have been adopted 
to a far larger extent by some governments than others, and followed more by some societies than others.   
We argue that these differences across otherwise similar territories (countries or subnational regions) 
are the result of low trust and political polarization and in turn, have had an impact on contagion 
and, especially, on COVID-19 related deaths. Societies strongly divided and confronted along parti-
san lines have been less capable to, first, garner the wide cross-party agreements necessary to take 
tough policies against a pandemic and to clearly communicate them to the population; and, second, 
to implement those policies effectively, for government supporters and non-supporters may opt for 
opposite courses of action. Political polarization is, among other factors, behind the refusal of many 
Republicans in the US to wear facemask (Gallup 2020), or the “patriotic duty” of conservatives to 
visit pubs in Britain (Owen 2020), and the bullfighting arena in Spain (Minder 2020a).   
 
The impact of divisive politics on the social and political response to COVID-19 has received notable 
media coverage, but limited scholarly attention to date. Most of the COVID-19 research has focused 
on epidemiological factors, yet given the unequal spread of the disease across territories, and the 
different responses by national, regional, and local governments, there are reasons to presume polit-
ical, societal and psychological factors play also a notable goal. For, as long as we lack both effective 
medicines and vaccines against COVID, the key variable to contain the spread of the pandemic is 
human behaviour (Van Bavel et al. 2020). In order to understand the devastation of epidemics we 
need to put them in a large ecological context, considering the social variables that may foster or 
hinder their spread (Morse 1996). Microbes thrive in “undercurrents of opportunity” made available 
through social and political decisions, or lack thereof (Krause 1996). This paper presents a pioneering 
systematic study of these undercurrents of opportunity in the case of COVD-19, and, in particular, 
of how political polarization may affect the lethality of the pandemic. 
 
The paper builds on previous literature indicating that both social trust and institutional trust are 
protective factors against epidemics. As it has been noted regarding the COVID-19 pandemics, how 
people are able to stay at home, to keep physical distance from each other, or to refrain from going 
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to a bar or restaurant, depends on the trust citizens have both on other people – i.e. social trust – 
and on their government – i.e. institutional trust – (Oksanen et al. 2020). Our paper makes four 
contributions to this literature. 
 
First, we do not focus only on levels of trust, but also on variation – or polarization - of trust among 
citizens. We argue that in societies where there is a wide gap in institutional trust between those who 
support the government and those who support the opposition, it will be more difficult to implement 
measures and recommendations against COVID-19. At the extreme, half of the voters could decide 
to wear a facemask and keep social distancing, and the other half could decide not only not to take 
preventive actions, but even to sabotage them, organizing protests and willingly violating the rules.  
 
Second, we posit that polarization and greater scepticism of expertise and international cooperation 
among political elites renders lead to suboptimal policymaking and implementation in the combat 
against the virus.   Using several original measures of elite level polarization and ideology, we test 
whether the average government partisan positioning and level of polarization along three ideological 
dimensions – left-right, gal-tan, and European integration – explains our outcome variable.  
 
Third, while existing research has largely concentrated on government outputs (e.g. anti-contagion 
measures) against the pandemic, we look at outcomes: excess mortality during the pandemic. In general, 
scholars have explored the factors leading to different government responses to the pandemic: the 
strictness of the preventive measures, such as school and workplace closures, restrictions on mobility, 
cancellation of public events, or public information campaigns (Cheibug, Hong and Przeworski 2020, 
Hsiang 2020, Sebhatu et al. 2020). Several works have also examined aggregate indicators of anti-
pandemic policies, such as the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) (Ce-
paluni, Dorsch and Branyiczki 2020). Few studies, however, have analysed health outcomes, such as, 
official accounts of deaths due to COVID-19 or the daily data on confirmed cases of COVID-19, 
from the CSSE at Johns Hopkins University (Cronert 2020). Yet both confirmed cases and confirmed 
deaths could be hiding an opportunistic underreporting of deaths by health authorities. A more real-
istic measure of the devastation caused by a pandemic is to compare the excess mortality in a given 
territory during this year vis-à-vis the five previous years. For, from a moral point of view, it is irrel-
evant whether a death – that could have been avoided – was directly due to COVID-19 or, indirectly, 
because the patient did not get proper care for his cancer or heart attack. Consequently, our outcome 
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variable of interest is excess deaths during the first 22 weeks of 2020 compared with the previous 
five years.  
 
Four, while several studies have explored the influence of political factors on policy responses, public 
adherence to government regulations, and COVID-related deaths, such studies focus on national-
level variation, overlooking significant within-country variation. For instance, democracies have reacted 
slower than autocracies, particularly the most solidly democratic, such as the Nordic countries, the 
US or the UK (Cheibub, Hong and Przeworski 2020). Authoritarian systems imposed more stringent 
lockdowns (Frey, Chen, and Presidente 2020).  A study of 111 countries found that those with more 
obedient and collectivist cultural traits experienced larger declines in geographic mobility relative to 
their more individualistic counterparts (Frey, Chen, and Presidente 2020). Moreover, most studies on 
institutional trust focus on cross-national differences (Marien and Werner 2019, Van der Meer and 
Hakhverdian 2017). That is particularly the case for studies on the impact of institutional trust on the 
(cross-national) divergent reactions to COVID-19 (Oksanen et al 2020). This research rightly notes 
that institutional trust is typically highest in Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden). Yet, as recent studies with EU regions remark, the subnational differences in institutional 
trust between, for instance, northern and southern regions in nations like Italy or Spain outweigh 
national differences (Charron and Rothstein 2018). And, when it comes to the COVID-19 pandem-
ics, the regional divergences within the borders of the same country in excess of deaths during the 
first months of 2020 (in comparison to the 2015-2019 average) are remarkable, as it can be seen in 
Figure 1. Many country capitals, rich and highly dense regions have suffered significantly more the 





FIGURE 1, EXCESS DEATHS IN PERCENTAGE ACROSS EUROPEAN REGIONS  
 
Note: Total deaths by region in 2020 between weeks 1 and 22 (until end of May) in comparison with Average deaths by region 
(2015-2019) between weeks 1 and 22. Orange diamonds (green circles) represent the region with the highest (lowest) level of excess 
deaths in a given country. Hollow, grey circles summarize all other regions. Overseas French and Portuguese regions not included.   
 
Figure 1 shows the importance of the sub-national level variation in most countries. For example, in 
decentralized Belgium, the share of excess deaths during this time in the Brussels region was 27.2%, 
whereas in Flanders it was limited to 11.6%. In the more centralized Netherlands, excess deaths in 
Limburg exceed 25% while Groningen had just over 3% fewer deaths. In even more extreme cases, 
we find remarkable differences between the Italian regions of Lombardy (nearly 55% change in 
deaths), whereas Molise witnessed close to a 9% decline in the same period. Similarly in Spain, excess 
mortality in Madrid increased by nearly 75%, compared with a 1.4% decline in the Balearic Islands. 
These within-country differences are at times far more meaningful than the country-level average 
differences: the most extreme comparison between Spain (23.5%) and Latvia (-8.8%) is smaller than 
the within-country gaps in Italy, Spain or France, and nearly equivalent to that in smaller, centralized 
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countries, such as Sweden or the Netherlands. Moreover, due to the nature of the crisis itself, sub-
national governments (regional or local) are highly relevant, as they are responsible for many services 
directly affected by COVID-19 – such as health care and social services, which renders them at the 
‘frontline of crisis management’ (OECD, 2020: 4). These factors motivate our choice of the level of 
analysis.  
 
In sum, this paper aims to contribute to the literature by examining the effects trust and polarization 
on excess mortality due to COVID-19 for European regions. We test four hypotheses. Two regard 
social division or the existence of an “uncooperative society”. We expect higher excess mortality in 
those regions with lower overall levels of social trust (H1) and lower mass polarization (measured by 
the difference in institutional trust between government and nongovernment supporters) (H2). Two 
hypotheses refer to political division or the existence of an “uncooperative politics”. We predict 
higher excess mortality in those regions with more political division (measured by the ideological 
polarization among the political parties in a region, and party fragmentation) (H3), and more popu-
lism (measured by a higher average score of the political parties in the region in the GAL-TAN and 
anti-European integration scale) (H4).  
 
Our next section develops the theoretical arguments, and the subsequent ones explain the data and 
methods, and present the empirical results.    
 
Theory: Trust, Polarization and Pandemics  
Governments around the world have responded to the COVID-19 in different ways (Moon 2020, 
Hale and Webster 2020) because they face conflicting considerations (Cheibub, Hong and Przeworski 
2020). Our central message is that, in dealing with the pandemic, some governments, national and 
regional (which are particularly involved in health care policies in many European countries), have 
been constrained by socio-political divisions. When taking and implementing the inherently high-risk 
decisions on how to fight the virus, governments have pondered whether they enjoyed sufficient 
support of opposition forces and the trust of their populations. Likewise, when deciding whether to 





Why have some regions and countries performed better than others in the fight against COVID-19?  
The pandemic has forced governments all over the world to intervene in the health, social and busi-
ness life of their citizens on a scale not seen since WWII (Cepaluni, Dorsch and Branyiczki 2020). 
The general goal was to flatten the epidemiological curve and avoid the collapse of health care systems 
(Anderson et al. 2020). To start with, the virus hit first (and hardest) some territories and not others. 
Although Alpine ski resorts, notably in Austria, seem to have played an important part in the rapid 
diffusion of the pandemic, northern Italy is generally regarded as ground zero of COVID-19 in Eu-
rope. The havoc it wreaked in cities like Bergamo and Milan sent a strong warning to the rest of 
Europe, but it could not prevent its expansion to other hotspots, such as Madrid, London, Paris, 
Brussels, or Stockholm. The higher initial exposure to the virus of some regions and countries may 
account for a good deal of its excess of deaths due to COVID.  Yet we argue that other sources of 
variation stem from socio-political divisions elucidated below.  
 
Social Trust 
To understand those differences, existing research has highlighted the importance of both social trust 
(also known as generalized or interpersonal trust) and institutional trust. We have known for long 
that trust is a cornerstone of healthcare, from an effective doctor-patient relationship to an efficient 
use of health services and adoption of pro-healthy behaviour (Rowe and Calnan 2006). Additionally, 
trust is regarded as essential for an effective response to disasters (Norris et al. 2008).   
 
In principle, the relationship between social trust and containment is complex: high-social-trust areas 
are economically more vibrant, and thus the virus could have spread there more quickly. Yet in high-
social-trust areas, citizens are more willing to contribute to the common good, and more conscious 
of the social consequences of their individual behaviour (Ostrom 1999, Putnam 1993).  In essence, 
when enacting orders and recommendations against a pandemic, governments must rely on the social 
responsibility of their citizens (Bartscher et al. 2020). Good behaviour by each individual citizen is 
dramatically required for the success of a strategy against the virus (Bargain and Aminjonov 2020). If 
social trust is high, governments can rely on first-best solutions that have low enforcement costs – 
such as recommending social distancing and hand washing, and asking citizens not to visit the elderly, 
and limit their travel – but that, as a downside, have a large risk of defection. (Harring, Jagers, and 
Löfgren 2021). Yet, if people do not follow the recommendations not to socialize or to keep physical 
distance, as happened in Italy and Spain during the first week of the pandemic, governments needed 
to take very tough measures, such as curfews (Oksanen et al. 2020). If citizens do not trust each other, 
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governments cannot take their optimal response – recommendations that allow citizens some free-
dom to implement them to their personal circumstances – and will have to resort to a suboptimal 
hard monitoring and enforcement of regulations, like curfews enforced by the police or even the 
armed forces.  
 
High levels of social trust may explain Sweden’s “light approach” to the fight against coronavirus and 
the fact that, at some stages of the pandemic, it achieved very similar results to some other European 
countries despite not undergoing a lockdown (Born et al. 2020). In contrast, low social trust may be 
behind some of the hardest policy measures against COVID-19 in European regions with a poor 
record in terms of controlling the pandemic. As Spain’s chief epidemiologist Fernando Simón openly 
admitted when justifying the closure of children parks in the region of Madrid, a measure that at-
tracted extensive criticism by experts in mental health and education, low trust in citizens’ behaviour 
was the main reason behind it: we need to close parks because “we do not have enough police officers 
as to put one in each corner of each park” (El Español 2020).  
 
Other factors closely linked with social trust – such as social capital or levels of civil duty – have also 
been found to activate pro-public health behaviour during this pandemic. Using mobile phone and 
survey data for US individuals, Barrios et al. (2020) show that voluntary social distancing in Europe 
during the early phases of COVID-19 was higher where individuals exhibited a higher sense of civic 
duty. Additionally, social distancing prevailed in US counties with high civic capital, even after US 
states started to re-open. A within-country study of Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Swe-
den, Switzerland and the UK showed that one standard deviation increase in social capital led to 12% 
and 32% fewer COVID-19 cases per capita (Bartscher et. Al 2020). And, focusing on Italy, areas with 
high social capital exhibit both lower excess mortality and lower mobility (ibid.). Likewise, there 
seems to be a strong association between social capital and the early reduction of mobility across US 
counties (Borgonovi and Andrieu 2020). 
 
Institutional Trust 
In order to comply effectively with government recommendations, citizens must trust that the rec-
ommendations they receive from the public authorities are correct and in their best interest (Harring, 
Jagers and Löfgren 2021). Evidence from previous pandemics points out in that direction. In 2014-
16 Liberia and Congo citizens who distrusted government took fewer precautions against Ebola and 




Similarly, a lack of trust in government may lead to bad health outcomes. For instance, the historic 
low levels of trust in government in 1990s-Britain were linked to the increasing hesitancy towards the 
measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine in large sectors of society (Larson and Heymann 2010). 
Equally, the outbreak of measles in 2015 in Orange County has been associated to parents’ low trust 
in American public health agencies (Salmon et al. 2015).  
 
Regarding COVID-19, influential observers noted early on that the major dividing line in the effec-
tiveness of the crisis response was not the one between autocracies and democracies, but the one 
between high and low trust in government (Fukuyama 2020). Moreover, institutional trust has been 
associated with lower COVID-19 mortality in early studies. Countries, such as France, Spain or Italy, 
with lower levels of institutional trust than other European peers experienced higher deaths rates in 
the first weeks of the pandemic (Oksanen et al. 2020). 
 
Institutional trust is may also be conducive to a higher adoption of health and prosocial behaviours. 
Citizens are more prone to act in favour of the collective if they perceive that governments are well 
organized, that they disseminate clear messages and knowledge on COVID-19, and that government 
interventions are fair (Han et al 2020). With regards to European regions, it has been found that 
those with higher institutional trust experienced a sharper decrease in mobility, related to non-neces-
sary activities, than low-trust-in-government regions (Bargain and Aminjonov 2020). Nevertheless, 
other studies have concluded that institutional trust is of relatively little importance for predicting 
whether people follow government recommendations or take health precautions, such as using face-
masks, social distancing, or handwashing (Clark et al. 2020). Or that trust needs to be paired with 
high state capacity for producing desired outcomes (Christensen and Laegrid 2020). 
 
Polarization and Populism 
Our concept of polarization is in line with the notion of ‘partisan polarization’, whereby attitudes of 
elites and citizens are clustered around their partisan affiliation (Drukerman et al 2013). Partisan po-
larization can take two broad forms. The first, ‘ideological polarization’, refers to partisan voters or 
elites holding more extreme positions on policy issues. The second, ‘affective polarization’ (Iyengar 
et al 2019), captures the idea that partisans distrust (or even dislike) those from opposing parties. In 
our framework, we apply the former type of polarization to the elite level (party positions in parlia-
ment), while the latter refer to what we could refer to as mass polarization.  We argue that both 
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ideological (or elite) polarization as well as affective (or mass) polarization matter for understanding 
the results in the fight against the pandemic. If a large part of the population – those who vote for 
opposition parties – do not trust their institutions, the implementation of effective policies against 
the pandemic becomes difficult. If the fight against COVID-19 is filtered thorough ideological lenses, 
supporters of a given party may find a duty in not following recommendations and health precautions 
suggested by institutions perceived as dominated by an opposing party. Given that face-to-face con-
tact has been significantly reduced during the pandemic, the polarizing effects from self-selected so-
cial media or partisan ‘echo chambers’ may enhance the effects of partisan polarization (Tucker et al 
2018). 
 
On the issue of mass-level polarization, a noteworthy example is the Republicans in the US. To start 
with, social distancing policies were taken more slowly in those states with Republic governors and 
more Trump supporters (Adolph et al 2020). At county level, the effect of restriction orders has been 
stronger in Democratic-leaning counties (Engle et al. 2020). And, at individual level, it has been 
shown, tracking data from smartphones, that Republicans practice less social distancing (Barrios and 
Hochberg 2020).  
 
The situation may not be much different in Europe. In April, Italy’s opposition leader Matteo Salvini, 
together with 74 MPs occupied the Italian parliament in protest at the ongoing lockdown in Italy 
(Roberts 2020). In October, supporters of Spain’s far-right VOX organized protests against govern-
ment restrictions (Rodriguez-Guillermo 2020), and in several Italian cities, including Turin, Rome 
and Palermo, right-wing demonstrations ended up with violent clashes with the police, including the 
throwing of petrol bombs at officers (BBC 2020a).    
 
Yet what motivates protests is not necessarily a right-wing ideology, but the ideological distance with 
the institution that imposes (or is perceived as imposing) the anti-COVID measures. For instance, in 
May, right-wing voters of upscale districts in Madrid demonstrated against the left-wing national 
government for allegedly curtailing their freedoms with the anti-COVID measures imposed in Spain 
(Viejo and Ramos 2020). While, in September, it was the turn of left-wing supporters in poorer dis-
tricts in Madrid to organize protests against the partial lockdowns decided by the conservative local 
and regional governments for allegedly being “racist” and “classist” (Jones 2020).  
This political polarization of a society is associated (as cause and/or effect) with polarization of the 
political elite (Hetherington, 2001).  We argue the exacerbated ideological differences among political 
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parties lead to worse outcomes in the fight against the pandemic through three mechanisms: first, it 
is more difficult for governments to build policy consensus with opposition parties; second, govern-
ment parties give priority to core constituencies’ (e.g. business owners) demands over public health 
concerns; and, third, because with polarization, policies become more populistic and less based on 
experts’ criteria (see Drukerman et al 2013).   
 
First, if political parties are ideologically distant from each other, governments will lack the support 
of opposition parties to take the necessary measures. To take extraordinary policies, governments 
need to build extraordinary consensus with other relevant political actors. Governments have to 
avoid taking erratic decisions once panic strikes following the onset of a pandemic and build consen-
sus around expertise-based solutions that may yield to better results at long-term, even if they impose 
short-term concerns. Building consensus is easier when, to start with, there is low polarization among 
the political elite. If opposition forces and the mass media that support them are ideologically very 
distant from the government, agreement about the adequate response to a crisis is unlikely. 
 
To take costly measures, like wide-scale testing and tracing measures, governments require the sup-
port of large parliamentary majorities that are improbable in highly polarized and fragmented party 
systems. One of the reasons of Spain’s poor performance against the pandemic in summer is that, 
after having had Europe’s strictest lockdown in spring, the minority coalition in government headed 
by the social democratic PSOE did not get parliamentary support to renew the state of emergency 
that allowed it to continue implementing tough measures (The Economist 2020). The conservative PP 
and the Catalan and Basque nationalists refused to back the PSOE in a highly tense political climate 
amidst accusations of lying and hiding the real number of deaths due to COVID-19. Rebuffed, the 
Spanish national government handed control of the pandemic to the regions. As indicated by The 
Economist “Spain’s poisonous politics have worsened the pandemic and the economy” (ibid., 23) 
 
Secondly, in highly polarized settings, governments may give priority to core constituencies’ short-
sighted interests over long-term social benefits. To start with, governments fear reputational costs 
for both underreacting as overreacting. During the early stages of COVID-19 many governments 
were accused of overlooking the threat. The opposite happened during the 2008 swine-flu epidemic, 
when governments were blamed for overreacting. For instance, the French government spent 1.5 
billion euros on swine-flu vaccines and, since swine-flu never reached a pandemic staged, the Minister 
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of Health was accused of misspending (Cheibub, Hong and Przeworski 2020). In all crisis govern-
ments face unavoidable trade-offs, and, during pandemics, governments are forced to weigh in 
whether the health benefits of draconian anti-contagion policies are worth their social and economic 
costs, such as sharp increases in unemployment and the worsening of educational outcomes (Hsiang 
et al. 2020).  
 
In relatively low-polarized party systems, governments may need to signal to its citizens that the high-
risk decisions they take serve public interests and not special interests (Cairney 2016). Yet in highly 
polarized ones, parties in government may prefer to secure the support of their core constituencies, 
knowing that their actions will not get the legitimacy from a hostile rest of society. For example, the 
conservative Madrid region government decided to reopen the interior of bars and restaurants against 
scientific advice, “given the importance of bars and restaurants to the Spanish economy” (Dombey, 
Chaffin and Burn-Murdoch 2020, 1). For the president of the region, the tough measures recom-
mended by experts would amount to “the death to our community” (ibid.). As a result of these pro-
business policies, the Madrid hospitality association declared itself “very satisfied” (ibid.). Quite the 
opposite, the Partnership for New York City, which collects the views of business, severely criticized 
governor Cuomo and mayor de Blasio for having “erred in the direction of favouring the health over 
the economic side of the crisis” (ibid.), for they ignored business pressures and kept the restrictions 
on indoor dining. The result is that two large metropolises, Madrid and New York, which suffered 
almost an identically devastating first wave of COVID-19 in the spring, entered the autumn with 
almost opposite patterns: the worst regional data in the early stages of the second wave in Europe 
(Madrid), and a relatively controlled situation (New York).  
 
Likewise, in highly polarized settings, governments may be unable to take short-term unpopular pol-
icy decisions, even if they are more effective in the long-run. For instance, the Spanish government 
preferred not to cancel the massive demonstrations on March 8th across the country to commemorate 
International Women’s Day, despite the existence of reports warning on the health dangers. As a 
matter of fact, three Spanish ministers leading the women’s rally in Madrid – as well as the PM’s wife 
– later tested positive for coronavirus (Minder 2020b). Yet banning the demonstrations would have 
infuriated core left-leaning supporters of the coalition parties: as one of the popular banners in the 
protest stated, the demonstration was more important than stopping the pandemic for “machismo kills 




In third place, highly polarized settings are a fertile soil for populist policies instead of sound expert-
based ones. An active participation of experts is needed to resist short-sighted political pressures 
during a pandemic. If civil servants are autonomous from their political superiors, they can speak 
truth to power, expressing their views based on their professional criteria, instead of trying to please 
their political bosses (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017). Expert autonomy and independence lead to 
decisions more guided by long-term considerations rather than short-sighted political pressures 
(Cronert 2020). This is, for instance, what happened during the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak in 
California, where local health department officials prioritized proportionality considerations over 
short-term panic reactions (Kayman et al. 2015). Countries like South Korea, or Denmark, contained 
the spread of COVID-19 through an adaptive approach, thanks to the preparedness, professionalism 
and technological capacity of those experts. 
 
The canonical example of political interference with experts would be the US under President Trump. 
Trump tried to politicize neutral, scientific-based bureaucratic agencies fighting against the pandemic. 
At the F.D.A officials were “forced” to authorize unproven coronavirus treatments that the then 
president championed but that scientists advised against, such as the malaria drug hydroxychloro-
quine or convalescent plasma (Interlandi 2020). At the C.D.C. political appointments by the Trump 
administration prevented scientists from publishing clear guidelines on what Americans should do 
against the virus. As a result, “decisions across the country about school openings and closings, test-
ing and mask-wearing have been muddy and confused, too often determined by political calculus 
instead of evidence” (ibid.). Likewise, the conservative Madrid region government, in its effort to 
minimize the importance of the pandemic, dismissed or forced the resign of a dozen of high-rank 
officials in health care, including the general director of public health, the manager of primary care, 
and the responsible for the Madrid hospitals, mostly in favour of tougher measures (Caballero 2020).  
 
Hypotheses 
From the above discussion, we derive four hypotheses to be tested. First, in relation to the existence 
of social division or an ‘uncooperative society’: 
 
Hypothesis 1, on social and institutional trust: The lower the level of social and/or institutional trust, the 
higher the excess mortality in the region.  
Hypothesis 2, on mass polarization: The bigger the chasm in trust between government and nongovern-
ment supporters in a region, the higher the excess mortality in the region. 
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In relation to the existence of political division or ‘uncooperative politics’: 
Hypothesis 3, on elite polarization: The higher the degree of ideological polarization among the political 
parties in a region, the higher the excess mortality in the region. 
Hypothesis 4, on populism: The higher the level of populism/anti-experts politics in a region, the higher 
the excess mortality in the region. 
 
Sample, Data and Design 
Our sample includes up to 158 regions in 19 European countries.1 The regions in question are largely 
at the NUTS 2 level, with the exception of Germany, Belgium and the UK, which are taken at the 
NUTS 1 level.2 The selection of cases was determined largely by data availability on key variables and 
on our aim to present a valid comparison of cases from a common region that was stricken by the 
pandemic at approximately the same time. The analysis therefore relies on a comparative, observa-
tional cross-sectional research design, as randomization of trust and polarization are not feasible. 
While this feature renders estimating valid causal effects challenging, our estimation is not subject to 
critiques of ‘reverse causality’ common in cross-sectional research, as the COVID-19 pandemic in 
this case is exogenous from our temporally prior regional-level, explanatory characteristics. This im-
plies that given our analysis accounts for possible confounding factors, our findings can be quite 
elucidating, yet should be still treated with caution.   
 
Our outcome of interest is the relative performance of regions in response to COVID-19. Recent 
empirical studies have relied on a host of various COVID-19 outcome measures to evaluate govern-
ment performance across countries. These include, inter alia, government response strategies (Yan et 
al, 2020), citizen compliance with government guidelines (Cheibug, Hong and Przeworski 2020; 
Becher et al 2020), economic outcomes (Ashraf 2020), or the spread of overall cases (Glibert et al 
2020), hospitalizations and case-fatality rates (Huber and Langen 2020; Oksanen et al 2020; OECD 
2020). While such studies have provided keen insights into governments’ performance in handling 
COVID-19, our outcome of focus is total death in (European) regions in 2020 between weeks 1 and 
22 (until end of May) in comparison with the average deaths by region for the same weeks during 
                                                     
1 See appendix 1 for full sample details. 
 
2 ‘NUTS’ stands for ‘Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics’, designed for statistical purposed by the EU Commis-




2015-2019.3 Our primary measure is the percentage increase (or decrease) in 2020 deaths during this 
time relative to the previous five years (‘excess deaths’).  
 
The main argument in employing this measure is two-fold. One, we are most concerned with how 
trust and polarization explain outcomes resulting from the COVID-19, as opposed to government 
measures taken or compliance with guidelines. Two, as many governments (national or regional) 
employ different testing regimes and differ in terms of counting COVID-19 deaths (BBC, 2020b), 
we argue that our measure of excess deaths allows for the most valid, cross-regional comparison 
across numerous countries simultaneously. The assumption of the measure is therefore that excess 
deaths in this period during 2020 compared to the same period in the previous five years can be 
attributed, directly or indirectly, to COVID-19. As we are unaware of any other systematically con-
founding events, such as alternative diseases or conflicts, which are germane to certain regions or 
countries, we do not have any valid reason to question this assumption. As demonstrated in Figure 
1, the measure provides remarkable variation within and across countries. The sample mean is a 6.4% 
increase in deaths, with a high of 74.5 (Madrid, Spain) and a low of -9.3, in the Central and Western 
Lithuania region. 
 
Concerning our main explanatory variables, we proxy institutional and social trust with data from the 
European Quality of Government Index survey (‘EQI’, Charron et al 2017). Data are taken from this source 
due to the unique sampling design that targets the regional level and provides between 450-500 indi-
vidual respondents per region. This far exceeds the regional sample size which alternative sources, 
such as the European Social Survey (ESS) or World Values Survey (WVS) could provide at the sub-
national level. The questions are scaled from 1-10, with higher scores indicating greater degrees of 
trust in one’s country’s parliament (institutional trust) and other people in their area (social trust). We 
aggregate the individual responses using post-stratification weights for age, gender and education by 
region to account for over/under representation of people with certain characteristics. Further details 
on question formulation and summary statistics are found in Appendix 1. 
 
Second, as polarization is a contested concept and its operationalization is without a universally ac-
cepted measure (DiMaggio et al. 1996), we construct and rely on several proxies in this analysis. Our 
first set of measures intends to capture our concept of mass (or ‘affective’) polarization to test H2, 
                                                     
3 Due to data availability, German and Dutch regions are compared with the averages of 2016-2019.  
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which is mainly focused on partisan polarization among the citizenry. In this vein, we build on a 
number of studies that measure the ‘winner-loser’ gap in democratic countries by taking the differ-
ence in trust or democratic satisfaction between supporters of the sitting government versus sup-
porters of opposition parties (for example Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Curini et al 2012; Bauhr and 
Charron 2018). Where this gap is low, we argue that there is a general consensus about the perfor-
mance of national institutions (whether of high or low quality), whereas when this gap is large, there 
are clearer partisan divisions and less mass-consensus in society. Using a question on the EQI survey 
about respondents’ partisan support, we then take the mean difference between government and 
non-government supporters by region, to proxy for mass polarization. Specifically, we capture mass 
polarization (P) in region ‘j’ via the mean of political trust among supporters of the sitting government 
party (or parties) in relation to voters of opposition parties: 
 
𝑀𝑃𝑗 = 𝐺𝑜𝑣. 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗 − 𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝐺𝑜𝑣. 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗 
 
To test H3 and H4, we proxy for elite (or ‘attitudinal’) polarization with several measures, relying on 
polarization of political parties in regional parliaments. We construct three measures. The first two 
rely on ideological partisan polarization, while the third is non-ideological. First, following several 
studies of parliamentary polarization on the left-right dimension (ex. Dalton 2008, Ezrow 2008), we 
take the standard deviation of parties on a given ideological dimension, where elite polarization (EP) 
is a function of the number of parties (N), their party position (𝑝𝑖) compared with the mean party 
position in the regional parliament (?̅?)4 and their relative vote share (v).   




This measure thus captures the average distance of parties from the ‘ideological centre’ (?̅?), yet not 
necessarily the relevant ideologically based conflict in a party system. It tends to rate two-party sys-
tems more polarized than multiparty systems with a large range of ideological representation (see 
Evans 2002). It will also make skewed multiparty systems seem less polarized due to the weighted 
centre of gravity (Klingemann 2005). As an alternative, we calculate the max ideological distance 
                                                     




between parties (see Mair 2001; Best and Dow 2015). This more pragmatic measure captures the full 
ideological range of party system in a given regional parliament: 
𝐸𝑃 = max(𝑝) − min (𝑝) 
There are clear issues with this measure as well, as small, irrelevant arties can alter the results quite 
drastically and it does not capture any distributional dynamics within the min-max range. However, 
if both measures produce similar results, this provides stronger evidence for our claims.   
 
In constructing both ideological, partisan polarization measures, the overwhelming majority of stud-
ies rely on a measure on the left-right scale, usually via expert opinion data or party manifestos. Given 
that the economic left-right spectrum plays a lesser role in Central/Eastern European polities (Bértoa, 
2014), we construct separate polarization measures based on three different possible ideological di-
mensions provided by the Chapel Hill expert survey data from 2019 (Bakker et al 2020). One, the 
standard economic left-right cleavage, which captures preferences for state-led distributive and reg-
ulatory policies versus a more market-centred approach. Two, to proxy for alternative dimensions of 
relevant polarization as well as H4 regarding anti-elite, populist politics, we take the so-called ‘GAL-
TAN’ dimension which captures social conflicts around issues such as religion, marriage and national 
identity that range from libertarian to authoritarian/traditional. Third, we also add pro- versus anti-
European integration stances, as this is a key dimension of competition in many countries, which can 
as gal-tan, signal division over international cooperation and trust in technocratic and expert policy-
making versus a more nativist, populist set of preferences (Dijkstra et al., 2020). We generate both 
the standard deviation and min-max distance polarization measures for each of these three dimen-
sions.  
 
In addition to the ideological polarization measures, we construct a standard measure of party-system 
fractionalization via 1-the Herfindahl index (Powell 1982; Wang 2014). The measure captures the 
amount of party competition in a given parliament (similar to measures of firm competition in a 
market.), where 𝑣𝑖
2 is the squared seat-share of party ‘i’, which is summed and then subtracted from 
1 so that higher values equal more fractionalization (or less concentration). The measure ranges be-
tween ‘0’ and ‘1’ where ‘0’ indicates that a single party controls all seats in parliament and ‘1’ equals 
perfectly equal dispersion of seats among different parties.  








Finally, we include several control variables that have been considered to influence variations in in-
cidence of the pandemic. First is age. The mortality of older citizens from COVID-19 is far greater 
than that of younger ones. We control for age, by including the average life expectancy, measured in 
years (from Eurostat). Next, it has been argued that the virus spreads easier in more densely populated 
areas, thus increasing risk for more deaths. We therefore account for a region’s population density 
per square kilometre (logged, from Eurostat). Third, many studies point to the benefit of institutional 
capacity in handling the pandemic (Hartley and Jarvis, 2020; Christensen and Laegrid 2020; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Burlina, 2020). We account for a region’s institutional capacity with the Euro-
pean Quality of Government Index (EQI, Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente, 2015), which measures 
the degree of perceived and experienced corruption, as well as the quality and level of impartiality of 
public services across EU regions. Fourth, we include a measure of overall economic capacity via its 
GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parity (PPP, logged)), from Eurostat. Finally, the 
mean values of a parliament’s left-right, gal-tan and pro/anti-European integration positions in sev-
eral models are also considered. Summary statistics and further information about all variables are 
included in Appendix, section 1, while more on the sample is found in Appendix 2.  
 
Estimation 
As our dependent variable is continuous, we use linear regression to estimate our models. Several 
diagnostic tests reveal several issues of concern that could violate the assumptions of OLS and thus 
affect our estimates. One, several of our explanatory variables show high levels of multicollinearity, 
thus we approach our estimation using several step-wise models, avoiding the inclusion of too many 
explanatory variables that co-vary significantly. Two, we find strong heteroscedasticity (Brasch-Pagen 
test, p<0.001). Third, even though many countries in Europe and elsewhere have taken a regionally-
focused approach in response to COVID-19, allowing much regional policy flexibility based on re-
gional disparities in cases, the regional observations are not independent, but nested in countries. For 
example, an empty hierarchical model reveals that 75% of the variation is in fact at the regional level, 
yet a significant percentage (25%, p=0.000) lies at the country level. To address the issue of nested 
observations – region within countries – there are several approaches commonly used in the litera-
ture, such as country-level clustering, country-fixed effects or hierarchical models that estimate ran-
dom country-level intercepts (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). As our data include only 19 second-level 
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observations, hierarchical modelling produces fewer stable estimates (Stegmueller 2013), while coun-
try-level fixed effects provide less flexibility with respect to degrees of freedom. We therefore elect 
to account the country-level context via country-clustered standard errors.   
 
Empirical Results 
We begin with a test of H1 and H2 – anticipating that higher levels of institutional and social trust 
will yield lower excess deaths on average, while greater mass polarization on these measures between 
supporters and non-supporters of the government will result in higher rates of excess deaths due to 
COVID-19. Model 1 tests the baseline effects of our control variables. We find that excess mortality 
during the first wave of COVID-19 at a regional level in Europe is connected, as expected, to factors 
such as ageing and population density at a regional level, but seems unrelated to the size of the econ-
omy and the regional quality of government, all things being equal.  
 
TABLE 1, TEST OF H1 AND H2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES baseline Social trust Institutional Trust 
    
Ave. life Exp. 2.418*** 1.907** 2.388*** 
  (0.786) (0.866) (0.725) 
GDP (log, PPP) -1.133 1.757 0.978 
  (5.050) (6.852) (6.512) 
Pop. Dens. (log) 2.905* 2.786* 3.029** 
  (1.394) (1.566) (1.361) 
EQI 2013 -0.465 1.366 0.491 
 (1.800) (1.740) (2.727) 
Institutional trust mean   -1.947 
   (3.607) 
Institutional trust diff   3.869** 
   (1.718) 
Social trust mean  -4.101**  
  (1.777)  
Social trust diff  0.672  
  (1.397)  
    
Observations 158 153 153 
R2 0.263 0.266 0.288 
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.236 0.258 
F test 10.18 13.94 12.57 
Note: Marginal effects presented from OLS regression with standard errors, clustered at the national level, in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In models 2 and 3, we test H1 and H2. Beginning with social trust in model 2, we observe partial 
corroborating evidence for H1, that higher levels of social trust are associated with lower mortality. 
All things being equal, a one-unit increase in social trust results in 4.1% fewer excess deaths in 2020 
compared with the previous five years. However, we do not find that social trust polarization is a 
significant predictor in rates of mortality. In terms of institutional trust, model 3 shows that while the 
coefficient for the level of trust is in the expected direction, the effect is not statistically significant. 
However, we do find support for H2 with respect to polarization of intuitional trust – in this case, 
we find a significant link between higher levels of institutional polarization and excess mortality. 
Figure 2 elucidates these effects visually. We observe that at low levels of mass polarization, the 
variable is statistically negligible, whereas we observe a that greater levels of polarization predict sig-
nificantly higher deaths. For example, the predicted difference in excess deaths between two regions 





FIGURE 2, THE EFFECT OF MASS POLARIZATION ON EXCESS DEATHS  
 
Note: The black line shows the predicted level of excess deaths as a function of mass polarization with a 95% confidence interval 
(dashed lines). The histogram shows the sample-wide distribution of mass polarization (e.g. the difference in political trust between 
government supporters and non-government supporters). Effects from model 3, Table 1. 
 
Table 2 reports the results for H3 and H4 – that elite level polarization is related with higher mortality 
on average. As noted in the previous section, we present several different proxy measures of elite 
polarization. The first measure is the non-ideological measure of party fractionalization, which cap-
tures the concentration of political power in a given parliament. Model 4 shows no evidence that 








TABLE 2, TEST OF H3 AND H4 





Ideology & polarization 
(st. dev.) 
Interactions: polariza-
tion & mean levels 
     
Ave. life Exp. 2.641*** 2.919*** 3.041*** 2.491*** 
  (0.877) (0.875) (0.840) (0.667) 
GDP (log, PPP) 1.218 -0.670 3.823 6.742 
  (5.460) (5.744) (6.341) (6.734) 
Pop. Dens. (log) 2.743* 3.480*** 2.694** 2.244** 
  (1.401) (1.185) (1.064) (0.973) 
EQI 2013 -0.202 1.273 -0.650 -1.280 
 (1.780) (2.436) (2.141) (1.851) 
Party fractionalization  -6.316    
 (11.292)    
EI max diff  -2.267**   
   (0.932)   
LR max diff  0.278   
   (1.446)   
GT max diff  0.669   
  (1.037)   
European Int. mean  -2.563** -3.051** 9.070*** 
   (1.103) (1.079) (2.551) 
Left-right mean  -1.110 -0.509 -4.870 
   (2.089) (2.018) (3.964) 
Gal-tan mean  2.000 1.893 3.424 
  (2.444) (2.459) (4.169) 
EI st. dev.   -9.733*** 31.552*** 
    (3.112) (9.050) 
LR st. dev.   5.649* -7.469 
    (2.731) (11.511) 
GT st dev.   -3.344 -1.678 
   (2.193) (8.727) 
EI pol * EI mean    -7.564*** 
    (1.821) 
LR pol * LR mean    2.201 
    (2.049) 
GT pol * GT mean    -0.780 
    (1.782) 
Observations 148 152 152 152 
R2 0.241 0.292 0.343 0.404 
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.242 0.297 0.347 
F test 8.889 10.78 7.818 15.58 
Note: Marginal effects presented from OLS regression with standard errors, clustered at the national level, in parentheses. *** 




In models 5 and 6, we present the two different proxies of ideological polarization. As the dimensions 
are related, we include all three simultaneously to estimate the effect of each holding constant the 
other dimensions and to avoid omitted variable bias.  Model 5 reports the measure of min-max dif-
ference on the three ideological dimensions, whereas model 6 reveals the results of average standard 
deviation difference from the parliament’s mean position. We test these under control for the mean 
position of each ideological dimension. As per model 4, the results do no corroborate H3. We find 
that neither model 5 nor model 6 demonstrate support that polarization on the left-right dimension 
explains systematic variation in excess mortalities. However, polarization on the European integra-
tion dimension (which we argue proxies for expert-populist tensions) does in fact explain mortality, 
as indicated in H4. Both the min-max (model 5) and the standard deviation (model 6) measures for 
elite polarization on the European integration axis shows lower excess deaths on average, while the 
left-right measure significantly explains excess deaths in model 6. We see moreover that parliaments 
that are on average more inclined toward EU integration also show significantly lower excess mor-
tality in 2020. Interestingly, the gal-tan dimension does not explain significant variation in our out-
come variable for either polarization measure or the mean level. Model 7 tests whether polarization’s 
effect on mortality varies at different mean levels of the three ideological dimensions. We find again 
that the left-right and gal-tan dimensions are not relevant predictors of the outcome, yet divisions on 
European integration are highly relevant. In sum, the interaction term reveals that elite polarization 
on this axis is associated with higher mortality in parliaments that are more anti-integration, while the 
relationship flips for those that are more pro-integration, showing that contestation over European 
cooperation is a liability when the parliament is relatively anti-European, while the converse when 










FIGURE 3, THE MARGINAL EFFECT OF POLARIZATION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, CONDI-
TIONED BY THE LEVEL OF OVERALL SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
Note: The black line shows the marginal effect of elite level polarization on the issue European integration on excess deaths, 
moderated by the overall (mean) level of support for European integration, with a 95% confidence interval (dashed lines) from 
model 5, Table 2. The histogram shows the sample-wide distribution of overall (mean) level of support for European integration. 
 
Overall, the models show support for three of the four hypotheses, with the relationship of H3 
emerging as more complicated given the interaction found in model 7. In addition to our control 
variables, we further test the robustness of our findings. First, our model presumes a constant degree 
of polarization, yet this factor might be affected the electoral cycle.  We re-run all models from Table 
1 and 2 and include controls for the age of a government, along with a binary variable for whether a 
region has an election in 2020. We find the results to be stable. Next, we account for the fact that 
several regions in our data are non-land contiguous islands, which could have the duel effect of more 
social cohesion together with better protection against the spread of the virus. We find the results in 





Since the beginning of March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has taken over the lives of European 
citizens. With its high death toll and its social and economic disruption – as a consequence of lengthy 
lockdowns, closure of public and work spaces, travel restrictions, and the re-establishment of border 
checks, among others – COVID-19 has gone from being considered as just ‘another flu’ to the biggest 
threat to hit Europe since the end of the second World War. But the incidence of the pandemic has 
been geographically very uneven, both across and within countries. Whereas some parts of Europe 
have been ravaged by it, others came out of the first wave of the pandemic relatively unscathed. This 
article has examined the reasons behind these substantial differences in incidence at the regional level 
in Europe by analysing how variations in social and institutional trust and social and political polari-
zation may have contributed to explain variations in COVID-19-related excess mortality during the 
first wave of the pandemic. 
 
The results of the analysis conducted for 153 regions in Europe show that, in addition to well-known 
drivers, such as age and density, variation in social trust are important factors explaining the uneven 
geography of the pandemic. Regions characterized by a low social trust witnessed a higher excess 
mortality during the first wave. Concerning H2, we find perhaps most interestingly that mass polari-
zation also played a significant role. When the divide in political trust  between supporters and op-
ponents of incumbent governments within societies is high, we observe consistently higher COVID-
19-related excess mortality. 
 
At the elite level, we do not find robust support for H3, that elite polarization has a negative conse-
quence for excess deaths. However, we find that partisan differences on one dimension in particular 
emerged as a strong predictor of higher levels of excess deaths. Regions with a political elite less 
supportive of European integration are regions where excess deaths have been significantly higher.  
We interpret this as a proxy for a lack of consensus on international cooperation and expertise, ren-
dering consensus on important issues more difficult, which lends support for H4. We find that only 
contestation along the European integration dimension, along with parliaments that are more Euro-
pean-friendly overall, are significant predictors, implying that mass-polarization may be more im-
portant than elite polarization during a pandemic.   It may also have affected the capacity of the 
population to abide by any type of anti-pandemic measures, botched or not. The consequence has 




Hence, lower or lowering social or institutional and greater social and political polarization may have 
ended up costing lives during the first wave of COVID-19 in Europe. As noted by Norris et al., 
(2008) and Oksanen et al. (2020), in order to build societal resilience against collective threats, we 
need a degree of societal and institutional trust (Norris et al. 2008, Oksanen et al. 2020). If that fails, 
especially in already polarized or polarising societies, the defences against a pandemic or other threats 
become weakened, making most attempts to combat it futile. If Pasteur said that science is the light 
that illuminates the world, we can say polarization is the darkness that shadows it, in particular among 
the masses. Generating trust and overcoming polarization are thus essential if we are going to succeed 
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